Unpaid Labor and the Presumption of Innocence: An Analysis of Ruelas v. County of Alameda
On April 22, 2024, the California Supreme Court issued its opinion in Ruelas v. County of Alameda, ruling that non-convicted (pretrial) incarcerated individuals working in county jails for private companies are not entitled to minimum wage or overtime compensation under California law. The Court concluded that pretrial incarcerated individuals employed under the contract between Aramark Correctional Services LLC. and Santa Rita Jail in Alameda County (established July 1, 2024)—which enabled non-incarcerated individuals to perform uncompensated labor in the jail’s industrial kitchen—were not entitled to lost wages or overtime premiums. Advocacy groups, including the ACLU, have criticized the opinion, arguing that it perpetuates the exploitation of incarcerated individuals. Despite the controversy surrounding the Ruelas v. County of Alameda opinion, the California Supreme Court acknowledged that the current laws governing non-convicted incarcerated labor are outdated, suggesting that California lawmakers should revisit them. By highlighting the ambiguity in the California Labor Code and the inadequacy of existing legislative proposals, the Court’s decision demonstrates the urgent need for legislative action to protect the labor rights of non-convicted incarcerated individuals.
To fully understand the California Supreme Court’s opinion in Ruelas v. County of Alameda, it is important to define and distinguish between non-convicted incarcerated individuals (pretrial detainees) and convicted incarcerated individuals (post-trial detainees). Pretrial detainees are a class of incarcerated people who have not been convicted of a crime and are presumed innocent under the law. The detention of non-convicted people is not intended as punishment; rather it is meant solely to ensure that individuals do not flee before trial or pose a danger to others. In Bell v. Wolfish, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed that pretrial detainees are entitled to at least the same constitutional rights as convicted incarcerated individuals. These rights include freedom of speech and religion protected under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as protections under the Due Process Clause. However, despite these constitutional protections, non-convicted incarcerated individuals often experience conditions as harsh as, or worse than, those faced by convicted incarcerated individuals.
The Ruelas v. County of Alameda lawsuit arose from allegations of the exploitative labor practices of pretrial incarcerated individuals at Santa Rita Jail. The plaintiffs, all non-convicted incarcerated individuals, alleged that they were required to work over forty hours per week—often six to seven days—without pay. Their responsibilities included preparing food, packaging meals, and cleaning the Santa Rita industrial kitchen facility to provide meals for county jail facilities, offices, and even third-party entities outside the county. The plaintiffs further alleged that Aramark and Santa Rita jail employees coerced them to fulfill these labor responsibilities under the threat of disciplinary measures, such as solitary confinement. The lawsuit consequently brought action against the defendants—the County of Alameda, Gregory J. Ahern (Sheriff), and Aramark Correctional Services LLC—maintaining that they violated California Labor Code § 1194 as they failed to pay the plaintiffs minimum wage, overtime premium wages, or in some cases, anything at all. Ultimately, the plaintiffs identified these labor practices as systemic exploitation that allowed Aramark to illegitimately profit from their uncompensated labor.
As we will soon see, California Proposition 139 played a pivotal role in enabling the contract between Aramark and Alameda County and maintaining the status quo of incarcerated labor. Passed in 1990, California Proposition 139, sponsored by then California Governor George Deukmejian Jr., was a citizen-initiated ballot measure (amending both a state’s constitutional amendment and state statute) that established a framework allowing state prisons and county jails to partner with private entities, business, and others to provide incarcerated individuals with work. While the proposition was initially a means to provide incarcerated individuals with wage relief, job skills, and opportunities to repay society, its implementation has largely failed to meet these promises. Even before the proposition’s approval, critics like retired California Supreme Court Justice Frank Newman warned that the proposition lacked sufficient safeguards against labor exploitation, particularly for pretrial detainees. Newman noted that the proposition left regulation of county jail labor to vague local ordinances and failed to distinguish between convicted and non-convicted individuals, cautioning that applying prison labor laws to individuals “convicted of nothing” was deeply problematic. These shortcomings would later haunt Proposition 139, in Velazquez v. State—which further highlights the proposition’s failure to ensure equitable compensation for incarcerated workers—as the plaintiff alleged that inmates working for a clothing company were not compensated for their labor. While Velazquez v. State involved a convicted incarcerated individual, the case highlights the proposition’s broader flaws in maintaining its promises of equitable and fair compensation.
Turning to the California Supreme Court’s opinion in Ruelas v. County of Alameda, the Court addressed whether non-convicted incarcerated individuals performing services for a private company in county jail could claim minimum wage and overtime protections under California Labor Code § 1194. As previously stated, the Court concluded they could not. The Court’s opinion relied heavily on two key legal frameworks: Penal Code § 4019.3 and California Proposition 139. Penal Code § 4019.3, enacted in 1975, allows county boards of supervisors to compensate incarcerated individuals in county jails up to $2.00 for every eight hours of work. The Court emphasized that this statute applies to all incarcerated individuals in county jails, including pretrial detainees. Additionally, Penal Code § 4019.3 also grants local governments the ability to offer compensation but does not require them to do so. The language extracted from Penal Code § 4019.3, which has not changed since 1975, thus served as the foundation for the Court’s conclusion that pretrial incarcerated individuals are not entitled to minimum wage protections.
As previously alluded to, the Court also examined California Proposition 139. In its opinion, the Court held that the proposition imposes no obligation on counties or private companies to comply with California’s minimum wage laws, as it only applies to public-private partnerships; Proposition 139 explicitly states that these other entities must follow local ordinances and other applicable statutes, including Penal Code § 4019.3. Therefore, the Court determined that Proposition 139’s wage provisions apply only to state-incarcerated individuals and convicted individuals, excluding pretrial-incarcerated individuals entirely. Ultimately, the Court concluded that non-convicted incarcerated labor in county jails is governed solely by Penal Code § 4019.3 and local ordinances, neither of which mandate minimum wage or overtime pay.
The California Supreme Court’s opinion in Ruelas v. County of Alameda raises significant concerns about the treatment of presumed innocent incarcerated individuals and their access to wage protections. One of the most telling examples of the Court’s misunderstanding of pretrial detention purposes lies in its reliance on the argument that “plaintiffs recognize that they receive certain nonmonetary benefits by working at the jail”. According to the First Amended complaint, “working in the kitchen means that plaintiffs can get out of their cells for some portion of the day, which is beneficial to their physical and mental health, and obtain additional food for their own enjoyment and nutrition”. However, this perspective ignores the fundamental purpose of pretrial detainment, which is not to rehabilitate or punish but to prevent flight or harm to others before trial. By applying a rehabilitation framework to pretrial detainees, who are presumed innocent, the Court mischaracterizes the nature of their detention and undermines the principle of innocence. In doing so, the Court inadvertently creates a discretionary distinction between pretrial incarcerated individuals and convicted incarcerated individuals performing the same labor.
The Court does, however, deserve credit for highlighting critical legislative gaps and acknowledging that labor protections for non-convicted incarcerated individuals remain governed by an outdated statute, Penal Code § 4019.3. The Court recognizes that the statute fails to provide fair wage protections to pretrial incarcerated individuals, leaving them vulnerable. The Court directly recognizes that the wage rate which was set nearly 50 years ago is inadequate to sustain current economic realities or address the financial burdens placed upon the non-convicted incarcerated individual and their families. While the California Supreme Court chose not to intervene directly, it pointed to the legislature as the appropriate branch to update Penal Code § 4019.3. Nonetheless, the Court’s opinion did neglect the coercive realities of pretrial detention, where participation in work programs often stems from economic necessity or a desire to escape the harsh conditions of incarceration. Pretrial detainees frequently report the need to work in exchange for commissary credits.
Denying wage protections to pretrial detainees while allowing private companies like Aramark to profit from their unpaid labor exacerbates systemic inequalities, disproportionately harming marginalized and low-income communities. Marginalized and low-income communities are already overrepresented in pretrial detention facilities, often because they cannot afford bail. The exploitation of their labor, thus, not only reinforces cycles of poverty and incarceration but also deprives non-convicted incarcerated individuals of the more equitable and regulated wages they could have earned outside of detention.
At a minimum, the California legislature should act on the Court’s recognition of Penal Code § 4019.3’s outdated framework and take steps to reform pretrial incarceration labor practices. Reforming Penal Code § 4019.3 should begin with raising the wage cap from the current $2.00 per eight hours of work to match California’s minimum wage, which is $16.00 per hour as of 2024. California Labor Code § 510’s protections should also be extended to non-convicted incarcerated workers under Penal Code § 4019.3. The protections should ensure workers are paid a fair rate for overtime (1 to 1.5 times their regular rate of pay over 8 hours a day or 40 hours a week). Non-convicted incarcerated individuals, who have not been convicted of a crime, should not be subjected to punitive labor conditions. Aligning their wages with the state minimum wage upholds the principle established in Bell v. Wolfish. Additionally, the legislature should streamline and standardize county ordinances regarding pretrial detainees’ labor. The current framework often creates confusion and inconsistencies, allowing for exploitation and disparities in treatment. Centralizing the laws governing non-convicted incarcerated labor under a clear, statewide framework would provide transparency and greater accountability, ensuring that the rights of this class of incarcerated workers are protected across all jurisdictions. Incarcerated workers contribute billions of dollars annually to prison systems through labor, yet pretrial detainees often remain underpaid or even unpaid. California has the opportunity to set a precedent by reforming its incarceration labor practices to reflect constitutional principles. Until these changes are implemented, thousands of legally innocent individuals will continue to work without fair compensation, reinforcing a system that already disproportionately impacts marginalized communities and undermines the presumption of innocence.
Edited by Maura Mulholland