A Blow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court’s Decision to Uphold Discrimination

During the civil rights protests of the 1960s, many pieces of legislation were passed to better secure rights for minority groups. Such legislation included the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Recently, however, civil rights legislation has come under attack with the Supreme Court’s decision in Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller P.L.L.C (2022). In Cummings, the Court ruled that emotional distress damages—obtainable through  Title VI of the Civil Rights Act—are not recoverable. [1] The Court’s ruling erects new barriers in the paths of victims who simply want to feel whole after being discriminated against. Thus, the crux of civil rights legislation is suppressed as victims will not be able to seek justice even though “emotional injury is often the primary, and at times the only, harm caused by discrimination.” [2] The Supreme Court erred in Cummings by disregarding contract law statutes, limiting its own judicial power, and convoluting anti-discrimination jurisprudence; thus, it must reconsider the question of granting emotional distress damages and overturn its decision in Cummings.

In the case, the petitioner, Jane Cummings, was blind and deaf, and her requests for an American Sign Language interpreter for physical therapy sessions were denied by Premier Rehab, a rehabilitation center. [3] Cummings later brought a lawsuit requesting compensatory damages against Premier Rehab, asserting that their actions constituted “discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Affordable Care Act.” [4] The circumstances in which compensatory damages can be awarded are central to this case. Compensatory damages are defined as “damages awarded by a court equivalent to the loss a party suffered.” [5] A plaintiff would seek compensatory damages to essentially restore the harm they had faced that had entitled them to damages. 

Cummings was permitted to bring damages charges against Premier Rehab under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Constitution’s Spending Clause. Title VI “prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, and national origin in programs and activities receiving federal financial assistance,” and was thus applicable to Premier Health, because it was a private company receiving federal funds. This case thus falls under Congress’ Spending Clause, in which recipients of federal funding, such as Premier Health, have to comply with federal stipulations because they have taken federal money. [7] Thus, as Premier Health violated Title VI in discriminating against Cummings, it appeared likely that Cummings would actually be entitled to damages. However, the Supreme Court did not agree with this perspective.

The Court’s decision relied on the precedent in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman (1984). In this case, Terri Halderman brought a class action against Pennhurst, alleging it had violated a provision of The Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act (2000), which requires mentally ill patients to have the right to “appropriate treatment” in a place that is “least restrictive” to their liberties. [8] The Court ruled against Halderman’s claims and offered a unique understanding of how Congressional laws are made applicable to federal funding recipients. The Court reasoned that “legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature of a contract” and that, in this contractual agreement, recipients are only bound to follow Congressional stipulations that they are made aware of. [9] The Court established that in accepting federal funds, recipients are not bound to the totality of laws that Congress may make. The Court took up this principle in Cummings; thus, the critical question in Cummings was whether or not Premier Health was likely to have been aware that discrimination could result in damages for emotional distress. 

The Court reasoned that because emotional damages are “generally” not recoverable in contractual actions, Premier Health would not have known they could be held liable. [10] However, in this analysis, the Court brought up the Restatement (Second) of Contracts §353, which states, “[r]ecovery for emotional disturbance will be excluded unless the breach also caused bodily harm or the contract or the breach is of such a kind that serious emotional disturbance was a particularly likely result.” [11] The first part of the statute holds that emotional distress claims do not warrant damages—a position that is consistent with the Court’s reasoning. But, the latter half of the statute enumerates exceptions to the former half of the statute, one exception being breaches of contract that are particularly likely to induce emotional distress. In such circumstances, emotional distress damages are recoverable. 

The statute’s wording is key: it affirms that emotional disturbance typically does not allow for recovering damages, but that there are exceptions clearly codified within contract law. Indeed, the exception discussing a breach of contract that is likely to induce emotional distress applies to Cummings. Assuming that Cummings does not fall under the list of exceptions—without addressing such criteria directly—is a shaky basis for the Court to stand on, since a reasonable person would read a statute in its totality, making themself aware of all its potential nuances and exceptions. 

The Court pursued this same, illogical reasoning when it applied the Barnes v. Gorman (2002) decision to Cummings as well. In this case, the respondent, Jeffrey Gorman, was disabled. After his arrest, he was transferred to a police station in a van that was not suitable to accommodate the disabled. [12] He then sued the police officials for discrimination based on the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, both of which required such accommodations. [13] However, the respondent was seeking punitive damages—damages that function to punish the losing party—which are only awarded in about five percent of the Supreme Court’s cases. [14] This is because punitive damages require greater harm to the victim than the standard used for compensatory damages because punitive damages are awarded in addition to compensatory damages. 

When utilizing the Barnes precedent, the Court compared §353 to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts §355, which concerned punitive damages: “punitive damages are not recoverable for a breach of contract unless the conduct constituting the breach is also a tort for which punitive damages are recoverable.” [15] The sentence structure in §353 and §355 are identical, where they both negate damages but add “unless” to delineate the exceptions. The Court, in Barnes, effectively ignored the exception to uphold the general rule that punitive damages are not recoverable. Subsequently, the majority in Cummings argued that because the Barnes court ignored the exception, they were justified in doing the same. [16] The Cummings majority even reasoned that the petitioner did not argue why the Court should do otherwise. [17] 

In applying Barnes indiscriminately to decide Cummings, the Court ignored a crucial distinction between these two cases: Barnes was concerned with awarding punitive damages, which are more harmful than the compensatory damages requested in Cummings. If the Court, in Barnes, had acknowledged the exceptions to punitive damages, it would have set a more drastic precedent by opening the gates for petitioners to arbitrarily punish parties who breached their contracts. This stands in sharp contrast to Cummings, where the petitioner simply sought to attain damages to make up for the loss incurred by her emotional distress, an outcome that would not grant petitioners complete freedom to seek punitive damages—which the Court is typically opposed to awarding. The Court in Cummings, therefore, should not have utilized Barnes as a crutch to stand on in justifying its disregard of the exception to §353. 

Additionally, in maintaining that funding recipients are not aware that individuals can obtain compensatory damages for emotional distress, the Court limited its judicial authority and further convoluted anti-discrimination legislation. This principle of constricting judicial power is addressed in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools (1991). In Franklin, the petitioner filed an action for damages on the grounds that she had been the victim of sexual harassment and abuse by a teacher. [18] The Court held that a damages remedy is permissible for an action brought under Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972. [19] In its opinion, the Court addressed claims that it had overstepped its power in granting damages, which some critics argued was the job of the legislative and executive branches rather than the judiciary. [20] In response, the Court asserted that awarding “appropriate relief [...] historically has been thought necessary to provide an important safeguard against legislative and executive abuses and to ensure an independent judiciary.” [21] The judicial branch functions to interpret Congress' legislation and ensure its constitutionality. However, in Cummings, the Court did not do this. Instead, it decided to abandon its interpretation powers—claiming that since the law surrounding emotional distress damages was unclear, it would obviate interpretation and rule the damages unrecoverable.  

Furthermore, in Franklin, the Court also reasoned that by stripping the judicial branch of its ability to award damages, the principle of separation of powers is undermined, allowing judges “to render inutile causes of action authorized by Congress.” [22] Thus, prohibiting the Court from awarding damages also inhibits Congress’ power by convoluting existing legislation—i.e., the judicial branch undermines the legislative branch. This was a point Justice Stephen G. Breyer seized upon in his dissent in Cummings, stating that the Court majority created an “anomaly,” where its majority opinion contradicted various existing statutes that provide for compensatory damages due to emotional distress. [23] 

Although the different branches of government have separate powers, they all have the same aim: advancing public welfare by adhering to the Constitution. In turn, there must be some consistency between Congressional legislation and the Supreme Court’s rulings. In Cummings, the judicial branch has obscured this when it comes to awarding emotional distress damages. The “anomaly” that the Court created disadvantages minority communities and benefits funding recipients. While there is clear Congressional legislation that prohibits discrimination, because of the Court’s ruling in Cummings, that legislation could be rendered moot by courts. Consequently, minority communities are exposed to blatant discrimination, and as long as the discrimination does not inflict financial or physical harm (which discrimination typically does not), there is no retribution these minority communities can seek.

The Supreme Court, in Cummings, has ruled to uphold discrimination in its prohibition of emotional distress damages. This poses a decisive roadblock for minority communities in the United States, a nation with a tumultuous history of discrimination, where the status of minority groups has historically been unequal to that of their more privileged counterparts. Nonetheless, with the advancements of civil rights legislation, the United States has moved towards accounting for the discrimination minority groups experience and putting legislation in place to hold the discriminators responsible. 

The Cummings majority set back this agenda through its disregard of contract law and existing anti discrimination laws. Because the Court has now allowed funding recipients to discriminate against minorities—as long as it does not graduate to the level of pecuniary loss—minority groups are once again subjugated at the behest of majority groups. The Cummings decision erodes the power of civil rights legislation, effectively signaling to minority communities that they can longer count on the government to effectively represent their interests. As a result of this, minority communities are left to fight for their own sanity and success. In addition, because there is existing legislation allowing damages for emotional distress, the Court’s ruling in Cummings is even more harmful because it advances a position that other branches of government do not subscribe to in practice. Seen in this light, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Cummings limits the ability of civil rights legislation to continue to benefit disadvantaged groups. This is an unacceptable result in a society that seeks equality for all. Therefore, the Court is obligated to overturn its ruling in Cummings and re-evaluate the question of recovery of emotional distress damages. 

Edited by Animesh Joshi

Sources: 

[1] Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C, 596 U.S. 1 (2022). 

[2] Urooba Abid, “Victims of Discrimination Have No Path to Justice Following Supreme Court Decision,” American Civil Liberties Union, July 12, 2022, https://www.aclu.org/news/disability-rights/victims-of-discrimination-have-no-path-to-justice-following-supreme-court-decision. 

[3] Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C, 596 U.S. 1 (2022).

[4] Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C, 596 U.S. 1 (2022).

[5] “Compensatory Damages,” Legal Information Institute, 2022, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/compensatory_damages. 

[6] Title VI, U.S.Code 42 § 2000d et seq.

[7]  “Spending Power,” Legal Information Institute, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/spending_power. 

[8] Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). 

[9] Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). 

[10] Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C, 596 U.S. 7 (2022). 

[11] Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 353 (1981).

[12] Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002). 

[13] Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002). 

[14] “Punitive Damages,” Legal Information Institute, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/punitive_damages. 

[15] Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 355 (1981).

[16] Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C, 596 U.S. 10 (2022). 

[17] Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C, 596 U.S. 10 (2022). 

[18] Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60 (1992). 

[19] Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60 (1992).

[20] Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60 (1992).

[21] Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60 (1992).

[22] Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60 (1992).

[23] Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C, 596 U.S. 15 (2022).