The Fall of Chevron: How One SCOTUS Ruling Will Transform the Congressional Landscape

After many months of anticipation since its initial consideration in January, the Supreme Court finally released a decision in June 2024 for Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. ___ (2024). This case has been watched closely by both legal scholars and average citizens for its deep effects on the regulation of businesses, healthcare, taxes, and many other facets of everyday life. Upon its release, the decision struck down a long-standing precedent set by Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), which has been used as the basis for administrative law arguments for forty years. Immediately following the decision, dozens of popular news sources covered the implications of this case, including how it resulted in a shift of power from federal agencies to courts and why these courts may not be equipped to decide the technical issues that they will now face going forward. These popular sources focused their discussions on deference and who was newly responsible for determining matters of ambiguity, yet few considered Loper Bright’s broader implications in the legal and political world. While the new precedent set by this case certainly raises questions concerning how well-equipped these courts are to handle the issues they will now face, the changes resulting from Loper Bright will be far more complex than a mere change in deference, and its changes will be felt across the legal world. The overturning of the Chevron deference by Loper Bright not only changes the legal powers of courts and agencies in interpreting statutes of ambiguous nature, but it will also significantly slow down the rulemaking process, introduce further politicization, and present a severe barrier for future bills to be passed.

Before being overruled, the legal precedent set by Chevron established a standard whereby courts would defer to a federal agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute if the agency interpretation was reasonable and permissible. In Chevron, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) released new guidance under the Clean Air Act (CAA) that created a loophole which allowed states to install or modify equipment without a permit if emissions were not changed. This was challenged by various environmental groups, including the respondent, the Natural Resources Defense Council. The Supreme Court considered whether the CAA’s term “stationary source” could be defined by the EPA, and ruled unanimously in the EPA’s favor. [1] This ruling established that government agencies held the power of deference in ambiguous situations if the interpretation was reasonable and adhered to the requirements and language of the established law.

Loper Bright overruled this long-standing precedent through the review of two consolidated cases challenging a rule established by the National Marine Fisheries Service under the Magnuson-Stevens Act. This agency rule stated that certain fishing vessels are required to bring observers to collect environmental data, and that the vessel owners must assume the costs of these observers. While lower courts upheld the agency rule based on Chevron, a 6-2 ruling by the Supreme Court in the consolidated cases struck down Chevron precedence on the grounds that it was incompatible with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). [2] Thus, the Supreme Court ruled that courts, not federal agencies, hold the power to interpret ambiguous laws.

As explored in Loper Bright’s dissenting opinion by Justice Kagan, joined by Justice Sotomayor and Justice Jackson, the decision to overturn Chevron was not one Congress directed. The dissent argues that, for interpretive regulatory issues involving scientific or technical subject matter, agencies have specific expertise that Congress lacks. They write that Congress acknowledges this discrepancy and has thus intentionally utilized ambiguity in statutes with Chevron in mind, intending for these qualified agencies to interpret ambiguity in laws through their subject matter experts. Congress had the option to discard the precedent set by Chevron by amending the APA or eliminating deferential review in discrete areas, but they chose not to do so. Instead, congressional members heavily relied on Chevron in legislative sessions. Additionally, the dissent notes that Chevron has been reworked over time to deny deference in cases where Congress has no reason to prefer an agency over a court, further clarifying congressional intent with regard to regulatory statutes. The majority opinion in Loper Bright counters that while courts may seek guidance from Congress, only courts may be deferred to for interpretation and ensuring regulatory compliance. [3] Thus, with this new ruling, courts are now given power to determine what is considered ambiguous, and to interpret ambiguities in regulatory statutes for which they are not the subject matter experts, nor were they the entity that Congress intended to resolve those ambiguities. Furthermore, congressional members who decided upon the initial bill are unable to legally challenge their decisions.

While this new ruling is a major change for courts and agencies from the previous Chevron precedent, there are many other consequences besides the change in deference. For example, this change is likely to slow courts down significantly. The new ruling states that decisions by agencies made under Chevron are not automatically re-evaluated, but must be individually reconsidered on a case by case basis per stare decisis. There is no standard measure for considering what is ambiguous, so ambiguity can be claimed in almost any new regulation. This new influx of cases will stall the courts system with cases that judges may not be equipped to decide upon without expert opinion. As courts seek out expert opinions, they must adhere to Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which states that courts are responsible for acting as gatekeepers for maintaining reliable expert testimony. [4] This creates a concern regarding who will be consulted to determine the needs of certain interpretations and whether or not uniformity across court decisions is possible with varied subject matter experts. While the Opinion of the Court states that an agency may still be consulted as an amicus curiae, or friend of the court, they may not do so if they are the defendant. Since agencies are often the defendant in regulatory cases, this is a possible but improbable option for most cases. Thus, the need for subject matter experts specifically in many of these interpretations can significantly decrease the speed of a court judgment on ambiguity as well as decrease the consistency of these judgments.

Loper Bright may also prolong congressional sessions because Congress is likely to stop favoring ambiguous statues. Although courts were given this new power of deference, Congress is unlikely to structure their bills with the intent of courts ruling on them because this Supreme Court ruling was not made with congressional support. It is still possible for Congress to delegate an agency authority within their bills, but as noted by the Opinion of the Court in Loper Bright, the ruling indicates that it is still the role of a court to independently interpret the statute and establish the boundaries of what an agency may interpret in its delegated authority. [5] Since the overturning of Chevron means that the interpretation of ambiguity will not be passed down to subject matter experts, Congress will simply stop favoring ambiguous language. Under this assumption, the new regulatory language under Loper Bright must be neither too broad nor too specific, as these bills must be as widely applicable as possible to avoid ambiguity. There are three main areas in which these bills are expected to be stalled as Congress debates this language. First, when a bill is released by the committee, it will be debated and amended significantly, since the language must be very specific and robust. Second, after the bill is approved by a majority, the bill will be brought to the floor for debate. If further amendments are proposed, then this exchange will continue until a conference committee is called to help reach a consensus. Only then will a bill be moved forward to the President. [6] This extraneous process is exacerbated by the need for very specific language and will make the lawmaking process even more divisive and challenging. 

Due to the changes in this process and additional pressure for congressional members to create unambiguous bills, we may begin to see a shift in how congressional decisions are made and which pressures congressional lawmakers face. As lawmakers attempt to avoid ambiguity and face challenges in leaning on agencies for subject matter expertise, they must now make expert decisions amongst other lawmakers, which is subject to party dynamics in a manner that agencies are not. Congressional lawmakers often experience pressure to align with their political party as bills are decided upon, and now that they will be deciding on matters that typically involve scientific and technical expertise, these bills may become more informed by party desires than this technical knowledge. [7] Consequently, Loper Bright’s elimination of Chevron precedence will create a natural tension in Congress as individual lawmakers face heavy political pressure, yet a need for exhaustive language makes bipartisan agreement necessary in a split Senate and House of Representatives. Thus, the elimination of Chevron has the potential to deeply inhibit lawmaking, as the new precedent places political pressures on congressional lawmakers to create party-favored bills, while the process itself favors bipartisan bills. 

While Loper Bright only legally changes the jurisdiction of ambiguity clarification, it will actually significantly inhibit lawmaking and present many challenges for congressional members. The effects of this can be felt at every level—Congress will pass fewer bills, courts will be slowed, and those seeking regulatory guidance will receive those recommendations at a much slower pace and with a far more political intentionality. As we consider this new precedent, it is necessary that we consider these challenges in addition to the legal precedent itself, as they create a completely new dynamic within rulemaking and deference, permanently shifting the congressional landscape.

Edited by Claire Thornhill

[1] “Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.” Oyez, Accessed October 22, 2024, https://www.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-1005.

[2] “Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo” Oyez, Accessed October 22, 2024, https://www.oyez.org/cases/2023/22-451.

[3] Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, No. 22-451, 603 U.S. ___ (2024).

[4] “Rule 702. Testimony by Expert Witnesses” Legal Information Institute, Accessed October 22, 2024, https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/fre/rule_702.

[5] Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, No. 22-451, 603 U.S. ___ (2024).

[6] “The Legislative Process” U.S. Congressman Bill Keating, Accessed October 22, 2024, https://keating.house.gov/policy-work/legislative-process.

[7] Jamie L. Carson et al., “The Electoral Costs of Party Loyalty in Congress,” American Journal of Political Science Vol. 54, No. 3 (July 2010): Pp. 598–616.