Raise the Bar on Raise the Age: Ending Child Prosecution in Adult Courts

New York’s recent Raise the Age legislation, passed in 2017 and phased in over the following two years, has symbolized a commitment to reforming the youth criminal justice system in New York State. Prior to Raise the Age, sixteen- and seventeen-year old defendants were prosecuted in adult courts, where they were subject to longer sentences and permanent criminal conviction records that made it difficult to reenter society. The new legislation changes the age at which youth under eighteen can be tried as adults in criminal court. While Raise the Age is an important step forward, it did not change the process for youth charged with violent felonies, still requiring their automatic prosecution as adults.

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What is a “Refugee”? Expanding the UN Refugee Convention in the Face of Climate Change

Over the next few decades, anthropogenic climate change will force hundreds of millions from their homes in a migrant crisis of unprecedented proportions. As global temperatures rise, a series of “slow onset” environmental catastrophes has been set in motion; in many regions of the world, fresh water is becoming scarce, agricultural productivity is declining, and rising sea levels are producing higher storm surges. [1] Modeling the effects of these and other factors—such as heat stress, more extreme weather events, and the loss of habitable land—on “livability,” the World Bank predicts “climate change ... could force 216 million people ... to move by 2050.” [2] While some of these displaced individuals may migrate to safer regions within their home countries, many will choose to move to countries less economically affected by climate change. Ensuring that these future migrants receive government support is necessary to guarantee that they can secure a livelihood and find community in their new homes.

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Why Title 42 Expulsions Hold No Legal Merit

The immigration policy of the United States has shifted in the face of the ongoing coronavirus pandemic. Title 42, a rarely-invoked section of the United States Code created in 1944, was revitalized by the Trump and Biden administrations to swiftly expel migrants due to alleged fears of the spread of COVID-19. [1] Despite the policy’s revitalization, however, current legal challenges to Title 42 show that there is no legal basis for such expulsions within its language. In particular, the disproportionate application of the policy at the southern border of the United States serves as evidence of racist motivations behind Title 42 expulsions.

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Media and the Right to a Fair Trial: Juror Impartiality in the Information Age

A 2021 study by Pew Research Center found that nearly 90% of Americans use the internet, social media, or smartphones regularly to access the news. [1] The proliferation of online information is particularly influential in high publicity cases—cases that involve terrorism or violent crime, garnering high levels of national media attention—in which juries may be skewed by the media they consume. In United States v. Tsarnaev (2021), the case of the Boston Marathon bomber currently on appeal in the U.S. Supreme Court, the risks of media bias are especially clear. In Tsarnaev’s case and similarly high publicity cases, trial judges ought to exercise more rigorous voir dire questioning on media consumption in order to protect defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to a “trial by an impartial jury.”

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The FBI’s Searches of Black Lives Matter Activists: A Budding Fourth Amendment Issue

Following the murder of George Floyd in 2020, many activists initiated protests of all forms to voice their discontent with the American government. Social media emerged as one prominent medium for activists to advertise their beliefs and organize protests—predominantly under the umbrella of the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement. However, law enforcement, especially the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), has utilized the very social media platforms that BLM activists make use of in an effort to connect them to terrorist activity.

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The Unconstitutionality of Real ID Legislation and Its Effects on Undocumented Immigrants in the U.S.

On September 11, 2001, the United States experienced the deadliest terrorr attack in its history. In turn, the events of 9/11 have had a lasting legacy on American immigration policies, leading to the creation of the erDepartment of Homeland Security (DHS), which is in charge of Customs and Border Protection, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). [1] Moreover, in 2005, Real ID legislation was introduced at the federal level as a post-9/11 policy to aid in combating future terrorist attacks. This legislation was passed as a way to standardize drivers’ licenses throughout the U.S. by setting minimum guidelines individual states would need to follow to grant identification and driving permits, including requiring the verification of legal status for every applicant. [2]

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Poland’s Memory Wars: The Legal Governance of History

In January 2018, the Polish parliament adopted the 2018 Amendment to the Act on the Institute of National Remembrance, which criminalized public speech claiming that the Polish state was responsible or co-responsible for Nazi crimes committed by the Third Reich. [1] The controversial act details that such claims “grossly diminish the responsibility of the true perpetrators of said crimes” and render individuals liable to a fine or three-year prison sentence. [2] Although the Act on the Institute of National Remembrance was established in 1998 to prevent Holocaust denialism, an undeniably positive aspiration, the 2018 amendment has resulted in the Act becoming a coercive mechanism for distorting and censoring national history. [3] On February 8, 2021, two Polish historians, Jan Grabowski and Barbara Engelking, were convicted of violating Article 55a of the Act on the Institute of National Remembrance (2018) in their novel Dalej jest noc [Night without End] for having accused Edward Malinowski, the mayor of the Polish village Malinowo during the Second World War, of abetting the Nazis. [4] Though the Act on the Institute of National Remembrance sought to protect Holocaust remembrance and demystify Poland’s ambiguous role under the Third Reich, the proceedings of the subsequent case—Leszczyńska v. Engelking and Grabowski (2021)—reveal the inherent threat memory laws pose to historical scholarship.

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SEC v. Ripple: The Regulation of Cryptocurrencies as Securities

Securities and Exchange Commission v. Ripple—a current case regarding the legal status of cryptocurrency—could be taken to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals (if not the Supreme Court) and set a precedent for the amount of jurisdiction that the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) holds over future cryptocurrency transactions. [1] Because this case could designate a new legal “guardian” for cryptocurrency, it has generated significant interest within the cryptocurrency community. [2] However, an evaluation of cryptocurrency against the standards established in the 1946 Supreme Court case Securities and Exchange Commission v. W. J. Howey Co. points to an ambiguous legal future for cryptocurrency. XRP, the cryptocurrency at issue in Ripple, appears more likely to satisfy the Howey test due to the centrality in its distribution and its exhibition of vertical and horizontal commonality. Thus, despite the furor regarding this case, the final decision in Ripple may not constitute a conclusive legal determination for all cryptocurrencies.

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Rectifying Bad Precedence: A Re-Examination of Strickland v Washington (1984) in New York State Courts

Gideon v Wainwright (1963) is a landmark Supreme Court case that incorporated the Sixth Amendment through the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, requiring states to provide public defenders to criminal defendants that cannot afford counsel. [1] However, since the Supreme Court’s ruling, it has been commonly observed that defendants receive less than effective representation from counsel, as public defenders are often stretched too thin and forced to grapple with enormous case loads, back-to-back trials, and abysmal funding by the state. Attempting to rectify this, the Supreme Court defined “effective assistance of counsel” in Strickland v Washington (1984), with the majority opinion adopting a loose set of requirements public defenders should meet. [2] This, however, has spawned its own issues. As Justice Marshall’s dissenting opinion predicted, the Court’s attempt to define counsel ironically exacerbated the issue by allowing courts to determine that lawyers have met the criteria of effective counsel without actually having provided it. Therefore, revisiting Strickland reveals that the Strickland test has done more harm than good, the dissenting opinion should have been considered more seriously, and the Supreme Court has a responsibility to rectify the injustices it has caused through this decision.

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