Roundtable #16 | Labor Law

Τhe views in these articles are those of the individual authors and not of the Columbia Undergraduate Law Review

Section I: The Struggle for Labor Rights: a Brief History of the Legislation of Unions in America

The legal history of the recognition of labor rights consists of judicial balancing between employers’ business interests and laborers’ interests in fair labor practices. In post-revolutionary labor combination cases, union members were fined because English common laws were still in use––under which making labor combinations was an indictable offense. [1] In the case Commonwealth v. Hunt (1842), seven journeymen in Massachusetts were charged for forming a union. [2] The Massachusetts Supreme Court established that labor combinations were not inherently illegal unless an organizations’ goals or practices were themselves fraudulent, false, forceful, or otherwise “criminal or unlawful.” [3] Later, The Supreme Court In re Debs (1895) upheld the federal government’s ability to use injunctions against labor strikes. [4] In 1894, employees of a railroad car manufacturer went on strike and disrupted business in the Chicago area. [5] Strike leaders refused to halt their activities after an injunction was issued in federal court. On appeal, the Supreme Court sided with the employers to protect the public’s interest in interstate commerce. [6] 

Subsequent court cases and legislation continued to adapt the extent to which private unions were regulated in favor of uninterrupted commercial activity. The Federal Transportation Act of 1920 established the Railroad Labor Board (RLB) as a means to settle wage disputes. [7] The RLB was largely powerless: in Pennsylvania Railroad et al v Pennsylvania R, Co et al (1925), a trade union representing the majority of Pennsylvania Railroad employees filed for an injunction when the company refused to recognize it as the workers’ representative––against the orders of the RLB. [8] The Supreme Court denied it because the Transportation Act was only a “recommendation” to act on such matters. [9] The 1926 Railway Labor Act resolved the issue by requiring union representatives to be chosen without interference from employers. [10] It supposedly protected employees’ right to collective bargaining, yet limited the right to strike by imposing a “duty” on both parties to “exert every reasonable effort” to settle labor disputes. [11] Thus the Transportation and Railway Labor Acts limited the rights of unions in the private sector in the name of protecting interstate commerce. 

Later applications of the Railway Labor Act suggested employers’ right to discharge employees could be limited to protect the right of laborers’ to organize; this reflected a shift in the balance of power between employer and employee in favor of the latter. [12] For example, in Texas & N.O.R. Co v Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks (1930), the employees sought an injunction against their employer because the company denied an appeal for an increase of wages made by the employees’ representative. [13] The company instead negotiated with a union that they established. [14] The Supreme Court sided with the employees, thus recognizing collective bargaining as a “proper recipient of legislative protection” and upholding the right to employee representation––a dramatic change from Pennsylvania Railroad. [15] These protections were extended later with the passage of the 1935 Wagner Act, which guaranteed the right to organize and “seek better working conditions and designation of representation”––for private-sector unions. [16] The Act was limited: it narrowly defined the circumstances in which it would recognize a strike, thus entitling employees to strike-related protections, and allowed companies to hire permanent replacements for striking employees. [17] Later legislation did little to help unions: the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act weakened the Wagner Act by explicitly defining unfair union practices. [18] Nonetheless, the Wagner Act was a win for the labor movement because it codified the right of virtually all private-sector employees to organize. 

In contrast, public sector unions saw little significant legal recognition until 1969 when President Nixon signed Executive Order 11491 granting employees of the executive branch of the federal government the right to organize. [19] Beyond this, there is no federal legislation that guarantees the right to unionize to all government employees to the extent that there is for private-sector unions under the Wagner Act. [20] Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Janus v. AFSCME invalidated an important funding mechanism for public-sector unions, leaving their financial future uncertain. [21] 

Thus labor rights of employees have been extended over the years for both private and public sector unions through federal legislation and court adjudications. The circumstances under which the right to organize was extended––and the differing evolution of public and private sector employee rights––reflects the ever-present debate in American politics on the role of the government in the market and on the rights of citizens conferred to them by the First Amendment. 

by Ilana Gut

Section II: Labor Law

In 1935, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) was ratified in response to harmful behavior by private companies. [1] Due to the high rates of unemployment during the Great Depression, many corporations used the grave circumstances of workers as a tool for breaking unions and preventing employees from demanding better pay or fair working conditions. [2] For example, many employers would only hire workers who agreed not to join unions or would threaten the security of employees who chose to do so. [3] Therefore, the primary purpose of the NLRA was to encourage “collective bargaining” and guarantee private-sector workers the “fundamental right to seek better working conditions.” [4] Enforcement of the Act depends on the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), a “quasi-judicial body” that hears labor disputes and seeks to resolve them through formal proceedings. [5] However, despite the board’s efforts, many private firms have found ways to undermine the Act’s critical authority and provisions. 

One of the most striking examples of this occurred recently between McDonald’s and the union-backed organizing group Fight For $15 in the case McDonald’s USA, LLC, et al. and Fast Food Workers Committee and Service Employees International Union, et al. In 2012, the group filed dozens of legal claims against McDonald’s and its franchisees for firing or disciplining over 100 employees who attempted to unionize in demand of higher wages. [6] Through the case, workers were hoping that the NLRB would consider McDonald’s to be a “joint-employer” with its franchisees. [7] This would hold the company accountable for any anti-union activity and would make it much easier for fast-food workers to unionize in the future. Despite recognizing that it is a violation of the NLRA to fire or punish workers for participating in strikes or other forms of collective bargaining, lawyers for McDonald’s argued that the company could not be held responsible for the labor law violations committed by its franchisees. [8] According to the company, 95% of its restaurants are owned by franchisees, meaning that the company has little to no control over the direct employment of its workers. [9] This, they argue, inherently separates them from the actions of their franchisees. 

In 2019, following years of delay and deliberation, the NLRB ruled in favor of McDonald’s. [10] The settlement simply required that McDonald’s franchisees pay $171,636 to workers who were negatively affected by the unfair practices of franchise employers. [11] This settlement agreement opposed the decision of the judge, who argued that, “in light of the nature of the violations alleged,” the settlement agreements did not “in any way approximate the remedial effect.” [12] In fact, the settlement did not include any concessions to name or consider the company a “joint employee” or a “joint employer” of its franchise workers. [13] Therefore, in the judge’s view, the settlement agreement was too “informal” and unlikely to resolve the case. [14] According to many fast-food workers and advocacy groups like Fight For $15, this decision essentially allows McDonald’s and other fast-food companies to “hide behind their franchisees.” [15] It clears the companies of any liability for unfair labor practices and protects them from having to bargain with unions. By allowing McDonald’s to claim that it is not the “rightful” employer of its workers, the NLRB fails to recognize the legal rights of fast-food workers — stifling their ability to unionize or to simply demand fair working conditions in the future. 

Although unions and advocacy groups have attempted to challenge the Board’s 2019 decision, their efforts have received a great deal of pushback. In the case of Fast Food Workers Committee, et al. v. NLRB, for example, the Fast Food Workers Committee, a labor union group aligned with the Fight for $15 campaign, filed an appeal with the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in January 2021, citing new evidence against the Board’s 2019 settlement. [16] The committee aimed to finally prove that McDonald’s is a “joint employer” and is, therefore, legally liable for any labor law violations committed by its franchisees. [17] In October 2021, however, McDonald’s and the NLRB jointly urged a federal appeals court to reject the Fast Food Workers Committee’s claims. [18] Such efforts speak to the power of private firms in the United States and the inherent lack of true care for the livelihood and well-being of low-wage workers. 

Like McDonald’s, many firms have a history of arguing that they are not a “joint employer” in order to avoid costly lawsuits. In Salazar v. McDonald’s Corp. (2019), for instance, workers at several McDonald’s restaurants in Oakland accused the company of violating the California Labor Code’s wage-and-hour regulations by denying overtime premiums, as well as meal and rest breaks. [19] Rather than holding McDonald’s accountable for the actions of its franchisees, the district court found that the company did not meet the state definition of an employer and could not, therefore, be held responsible for any of the labor law violations. [20] Other companies, like Dominos, have also been able to use this tactic. For example, in Patterson v. Domino’s Pizza (2014), a male manager of one of the company’s franchisees was accused of sexually harassing a female employee during work. [21] Although the company offers its franchisees training and advice on the hiring and firing of employees, the California Supreme Court ruled that Dominos was not a direct “employer.” [22] Therefore, it could not be held responsible for the illicit actions of franchise employees. [23]

So long as private companies like Dominos or McDonald’s continue to fall back on the “joint-employer” argument when facing lawsuits, they will continue to make massive profits off of their franchisees while avoiding any legal responsibility over them. This is inherently problematic as it prevents private companies from having to make any systematic changes that might improve the conditions experienced by workers. It is, therefore, the duty of the NLRB to recognize the consequences of its 2019 settlement and to hold private firms like McDonald’s accountable for unfair labor practices. As long as these companies continue to make a profit off of their franchisees, it is their duty to ensure that all owners, managers, and employees, who represent and serve the company, abide by national and state labor laws. Otherwise, they will continue to get away with unfair labor practices and neglect the critical needs of their workers. Therefore, until this corruption is addressed, it is questionable whether American labor laws truly protect the rights of vulnerable workers. 

by Selma Nouri

Section III: Vaccine Mandates: How Do Unions Play a Role?

Recently, business reopenings have raised legal questions about employers’ abilities to create safe, in-person workplaces, especially relating to mandatory COVID-19 vaccinations. While the EEOC’s recent guidelines allow private employers to mandate vaccinations for all employees other than those medically or religiously exempt [1], a point of contention is the role of unions in arbitrating implementation.
There are two types of arbitration which unions utilize in negotiation: interest arbitration and grievance arbitration (also known as rights arbitration). While grievance arbitration resolves violations of current terms of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), interest arbitration addresses deadlocks resulting from negotiation of new terms. [2] This difference poses the legal issue present: Does compulsory vaccination extend pre-existing provisions or create entirely new ones? Can unions demand arbitration for these potentially new terms? Do unions even have such privileges currently?

A U.S. District Court case in Illinois, Int'l Brotherhood. of Teamsters, Local 743 v. Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Funds, deals with the question of interest arbitration. [3] When vaccination was made mandatory for employees of the defendant, the plaintiff moved to advance both grievance arbitration and interest arbitration for the new policy. The Court found that the phrase in the company’s CBA governing interest arbitration – “plan of an economic nature covering wages or other benefits” – means the implementation requires being both economic in nature and affecting wages or benefits. [4] While there may be attenuated wage consequences due to refusing a vaccine, the Court held that the new provision isn’t economic since it doesn’t relate to “the production of goods or services,” and therefore falls outside the scope of interest arbitration. [5] Relating this decision nationally, it should be noted that CBAs commonly use the phrase “of an economic nature.” For instance, UPSEU, a large union representing the Northeast, contains this exact language in one of their prominent CBAs. [6] Taking into account the Supreme Court’s ruling in Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc. that for CBAs, courts must use “federal rules of law in order to ensure uniform interpretation of collective-bargaining agreements”, lawsuits elsewhere would result in a similar ruling. [7] We see, then, that interest arbitration for vaccine mandates is beyond unions’ legal purview, assuming the consistent use of language.

A point to note about the Teamsters ruling is the expectation that the defendant will commence grievance arbitration for claims encompassing existing terms of the CBA. [8] This should not be interpreted, however, as blanket validation for unions to force rights arbitration. Again, we must view power granted by CBAs through contract law. A decision by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in United Steel v. LLFlex, LLC considered a CBA with a restrictive clause allowing arbitration only for “any grievances or differences that might arise between the Company and the employees as to working conditions, discharges, seniority rights, layoff and re-employment.” [9] In the case of clauses like this with specific bounds, the principle expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the inclusion of the one is the exclusion of the other) is the default rule of interpretation. [10] Consequently, the Sixth Circuit found that this clause could not be expanded to include retirement benefits, which were at issue. Rather, the Court explained, a broader clause contains phrases like “any dispute” or “any disagreement.” [11] In other words, anything not explicit in a CBA’s grievance arbitration clause, be it retirement in United Steel or health directives for vaccine mandates, cannot be subject to collective bargaining under existing terms.

Therefore, only through a sufficiently expansive clause in a union’s CBA, like that of  Teamsters, will a union be able to proceed with grievance arbitration. Practically, this means some unions without wide-ranging contracts, like the defendant in United Steel, will not be legally capable of representing their employees’ interests in most COVID-related issues through collective bargaining.

Consequently, as reopenings continue, it would make sense to see one of two CBA changes: either modifying interest arbitration clauses to no longer require economic grounds, or standardizing more encompassing grievance arbitration terms. To employers, the second option is more attractive because it is less disruptive to their status quo. Instead of giving leverage to unions by allowing them to negotiate new terms on any issue, the more reasonable alternative to expect from employers is giving bargainers a wider scope for pre-existing agreements. Another weakness of the first option is the fact that essentially every claim could be subject to both rights and interest arbitration, making one or the other potentially contradictory. [12] While shifts in CBAs inevitably meet resistance from employers, this is merely one of the many ways in which the pandemic has realigned labor relations.

by Daniel Kroll

Section IV: Labor Law and Collective Bargaining

Collective bargaining, or the means through which workers, organized into a labor union, negotiate a beneficial contract with their employers, has a long historical tradition in the landscape of United States labor law. [1] However, there has been a notable shift in the way that the Supreme Court has grappled with collective bargaining rights under the Roberts Court. In recent years, the Court has consistently prioritized the civil liberties of the individual over union interests, notably shifting away from past decisions. This shift in legal standing for union activities fundamentally weakens the role of unions in the workplace. By weakening collective bargaining in the name of civil liberties, the Court is changing established precedent in a way that perpetuates income inequality.

In the last five years, the Roberts Court has shifted more towards protecting civil liberties, as reflected in its recent decisions concerning collective bargaining. In Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid (2021), the Court held that a regulation permitting union representatives to enter private property constituted a physical taking without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. [2] The regulation contested was a California rule allowing union representatives to organize with agricultural workers at private worksites at set intervals throughout the year. On October 29, 2015, organizers from the United Farm Workers entered Cedar Point Nursery (CPN) without offering the required notice of entry mandated by state law. CPN challenged this action as an unjust taking without compensation. The Court had previously established the existence of two types of takings, physical takings and use restrictions. [3] In its decision, the Court held that the entry of union representatives to the property without permission weakened the value of their property ownership, thus constituting a physical taking. This decision significantly restricted the ability of collective organization to take place, with the justification of protecting individual liberties.

The prioritization of the individual over collective bargaining was similarly emphasized in Janus v. AFSCME (2018), a case concerning public-sector unions. In Janus, the Court considered the constitutionality of an Illinois law requiring public employees who were represented by a union to pay “agency fees,” or a portion of union dues equivalent to the cost of per capita collective bargaining efforts. Mark Janus, a state employee who disagreed with the views of his union, refused to pay these fees and opted instead to challenge the law, arguing that it infringed on his 1st Amendment right to expression. [4] Under the precedent set in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education (1977), agency fees were permitted to ensure compensation by non-union members who still benefited from the negotiation activities of the union. [5] However, Abood held that non-members could not be expected to compensate political activities by the union. In Janus, the Roberts Court found that this case had been wrongly decided, arguing that it did not actively consider the First Amendment in its ruling. Agency fees, as established under Abood, were found to not withstand exacting scrutiny, the metric used to evaluate if certain statutes, like the Illinois statute, are in violation of the First Amendment. In turn, the Court also found that the statute did not withstand exacting scrutiny. In essence, it overturned the use of agency fees in their entirety, resulting in a weakening of public union strength. Individual rights — in this case, that of free speech — trumped collective bargaining, in a reversal of precedent.

Already, the effects of Janus have started to crystalize, revealing the potential danger for union organization. While union membership has remained relatively constant, sometimes even increasing, unions have lost access to agency fees, resulting in a weakening of financial stability. Previous instances wherein agency fees were removed on the state level have resulted in a significant loss of membership over time, as the Michigan Education Association, a teachers union, suffered from several years prior. While they similarly did not lose much of their membership immediately, they eventually suffered from a 27% reduction in membership [6]. While the removal of agency fees has not yet resulted in a notable decline in membership, the strength of unions remains hobbled. Agency fees offered a valuable tool to encourage union membership. The tacit balance Abood struck between agency fees and First Amendment protections was functioning successfully, as argued in Justice Kagan’s dissent. She noted that governmental organizations have long had “substantial latitude” to influence the workplace in the name of efficiency. By inserting governmental influence into the workplace, agency fees implicitly protect speech hostile to managerial interests. Additionally, Kagan noted that Abood was a functioning, well-established precedent. [7] By overturning it, the Court ignored principles of stare decisis and changed the relationship between workers and their employers.

The Court’s weakening of union organization, both in the private and public sectors, raises the specter of increased income inequality. A recent study, conducted in 2018 by economists at Princeton University, confirmed the strong inverse relationship between the “density” of unions and income inequality. This study also confirmed that this relationship was one of causation, highlighting the direct role of unions in fostering income growth [8]. Collective bargaining also results in the strengthening of employee benefits, further reducing the threat of income inequality. When the right to organize is hindered by the law, wage stagnation, corporate exploitation and income inequality all flourish [9]. By prioritizing civil liberties over collective bargaining, the Court is inadvertently harming the individual. Janus and Cedar Point Nursery both represent a seismic shift in the role of unions in the workplace. Now, with collective bargaining crippled in public and private workplaces, individuals are expected to fend for themselves.

by Devon Hunter

This Roundtable was edited by Will Foster

Section 1 Citations:

[1] Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111, 121-123 (1842) (Shaw, C.J.). 

[2] id at 112.

[3] id at 129. 

[4] Sarah Pruitt, How a Deadly Railroad Strike Led to the Labor Day Holiday, History.com (2021), online at https://www.history.com/news/labor-day-pullman-railway-strike-origins (visited Nov 14, 2021). 

[5] id. 

[6] In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 573-581 (1895).

[7] Edgar J. Rich, “The Transportation Act of 1920,” 10 American Economic Review 3, 512 (1920).

[8] Pennsylvania Railroad et al. v. Pennsylvania R. Co. et al., 267 U.S. 203, 208 (1925). 

[9] “Effect of the Railway Labor Act of 1926 upon Company Unions,” 42 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 109 (1928). 

[10] id. 

[11] Highlights of the Railway Labor Act, Federal Railroad Administration, online at https://railroads.dot.gov/sites/fra.dot.gov/files/fra_net/1647/Railway%20Labor%20Act%20Overview.pdf (visited Nov 14, 2021). 

[12] “Federal Protection of Collective Bargaining under the Railway Labor Act of 1926,” 40 Yale Law Journal 1, 97 (1930). 

[13] Texas & N.O.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 550 (1930).

[14] id. 

[15] “Federal Protection of Collective Bargaining,” supra note 12, at 98.

[16] National Labor Relations Act, National Labor Relations Board, online at https://www.nlrb.gov/guidance/key-reference-materials/national-labor-relations-act (visited Nov 14, 2021).

[17] Craig Becker, “‘Better than a Strike’: Protecting New Forms of Collective Work Stoppages under the National Labor Relations Act,” 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 2, 354 (1994).

[18] 1947 Taft-Hartley Substantive Provisions, National Labor Relations Board, online at https://www.nlrb.gov/about-nlrb/who-we-are/our-history/1947-taft-hartley-substantive-provisions (visited Nov 14, 2021). 

[19] Paul Moreno, The History of Public Sector Unionism, Hillsdale College, online at https://www.hillsdale.edu/educational-outreach/free-market-forum/2011-archive/the-history-of-public-sector-unionism/ (visited Nov 14, 2021). 

[20] Alexia Fernández Campbell, Government Workers Don’t Have a Federal Right to Unionize. Democrats Want to Change that, Vox (June 25, 2019), online at https://www.vox.com/2019/6/25/18715531/public-sector-government-workers-union-bill-congress (visited Nov 14, 2021). 

[21] Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, et al,  138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018); Aaron Tang, “Life After Janus,” 119 Columbia Law Review 3, 679 (2019). 

Section 2 Citations:

[1] National Labor Relations Board, National Labor Relations Act, online at https://www.nlrb.gov/guidance/key-reference-materials/national-labor-relations-act (visited November 12, 2021). 

[2] Emily Bazelon, Why Are Workers Struggling? Because Labor Law Is Broken, The New York Times (February 20, 2020), online at https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/02/19/magazine/labor-law-unions.html (visited November 11, 2021). 

[3] id.

[4] National Labor Relations Board, National Labor Relations Act, online at https://www.nlrb.gov/guidance/key-reference-materials/national-labor-relations-act (visited November 12, 2021). 

[5] National Labor Relations Board, Who Are We, online at https://www.nlrb.gov/guidance/key-reference-materials/national-labor-relations-act (visited November 12, 2021). 

[6] Steven Greenhouse, McDonald’s Ruling Could Open Door for Unions, The New York Times (July 29, 2014), online at https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/business/nlrb-holds-mcdonalds-not-just-franchisees-liable-for-worker-treatment.html (visited November 11, 2021). 

[7] id.

[8] Bazelon, supra note 2. 

[9] id. 

[10] McDonald’s USA, LLC, a joint employer, et al. and Fast Food Workers Committee and Service Employees International Union, et al., ​​368 NLRB No. 134 (2019), https://apps.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d4582eab79a. 

[11] Dee-Ann Durbin, NLRB Rules for McDonald's in Long-Running Labor Union Case, USA Today (December 13, 2019), online at https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2019/12/12/national-labor-relations-board-rules-mcdonalds-union-case/4415239002/ (visited November 11, 2021).

[12] McDonald’s USA, LLC, supra note 10.

[13] Dee-Ann Durbin, NLRB Rules for McDonald’s in Long-Running Labor Union Case. USA Today (December 13, 2019), online at https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2019/12/12/national-labor-relations-board-rules-mcdonalds-union-case/4415239002/ (visited November 11, 2021).

[14] McDonald’s USA, LLC, supra note 10.  

[15] Greenhouse, supra note 6. 

[16] Brief for National Labor Relations Board in Fast Food Workers Committee v. NLRB (2021), U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, No. 20-1516, 

https://fingfx.thomsonreuters.com/gfx/legaldocs/byvrjrbxwve/EMPLOYMENT_MCDONALDS_APPEAL_brief.pdf.

[17] id.

[18] Daniel Wiessner, McDonald’s, NLRB Say ‘Joint Employer’ Settlement Was Fair, Reuters (October 21, 2021), online at https://www.reuters.com/legal/legalindustry/mcdonalds-nlrb-say-joint-employer-settlement-was-fair-2021-10-21/ (visited November 12, 2021). 

[19] Salazar v. McDonald’s Corp., 939 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2019).  

[20] id. 

[21] Patterson v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 60 Cal. 4th 474 (2014). 

[22] id. 

[23] id.

Section 3 Citations: 

[1] Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, What You Should Know About COVID-19 and the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and Other EEO Laws, §K, online at https://www.eeoc.gov/wysk/what-you-should-know-about-covid-19-and-ada-rehabilitation-act-and-other-eeo-laws#K (visited November 7, 2021).

[2] Barry Winograd, An Introduction to the History of Interest Arbitration in the United States, Labor L.J. 164 (Fall 2010).

[3] Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 743 v. Cent. States Se. & Sw. Areas Health & Welfare & Pension Funds, 21 C 3840 (N.D. Ill., Oct. 12, 2021) (slip opinion).

[4] id at 7.

[5] id at 9.

[6] Collective Bargaining Agreement By and Between Professional Transportation Inc. and UPSEU Local 1222, April 30, 2015, http://images.usw.org/PTIU/PTI-CBA-2015-2018-final.pdf.

[7] Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 404 (1988).

[8] Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 743, 21 C 3840, at 10.

[9] United Steel v. LLFlex, LLC, No. 19-5464 (6th Cir. Mar. 24, 2021) (slip op., at 5).

[10] Dexter Axle, 418 F.3d at 766. 

[11] United Steel, No. 19-5464, at 5.

[12] Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 743, 21 C 3840, at 8.

Section 4 Citations:

[1] Collective Bargaining, AFL-CIO - America’s Unions, online at https://aflcio.org/what-unions-do/empower-workers/collective-bargaining (visited December 1, 2021). 

[2] Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 594 U.S. ___ (2021).

[3] Penn Central Transportation Company v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).

[4] Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, 585 U.S. ___ (2018).

[5] Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977).

[6] Mike Antonucci, Union Report: One Year Later, It’s Clear — the Janus Effect Is Not Yet What Either Side Had Hoped for, or Feared, The 74 (June 25, 2019).
[7] id at 4.

[8] Henry S. Farber, Daniel Herbst, Ilyana Kuziemko, & Suresh Naidu, “Unions and Inequality Over the Twentieth Century: New Evidence from Survey Data,” Industrial Relations Section, Princeton University (May 2, 2018), online at https://dataspace.princeton.edu/bitstream/88435/dsp01gx41mm54w/3/620.pdf (visited December 1, 2021). 

[9] Susan Dynarski, Fresh Proof That Strong Unions Help Reduce Income Inequality, The New York Times (July 6, 2018), online at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/06/business/labor-unions-income-inequality.html (visited December 1, 2021).