What a Structural Remedy for Google Means: Implications for Consumers

In the last decade, Google has become synonymous with the internet itself, its search engine serving as the primary gateway for billions of users to access information, commerce, and utilities. Google’s unparalleled dominance in the digital marketplace – particularly in search and advertising – has made the company a focal point of legal scrutiny, provoking inquiry from regulators worldwide. In the United States, this scrutiny has culminated in two ongoing antitrust cases brought by the Department of Justice (DOJ), representing the most significant antitrust challenges to a tech giant since United States v. Microsoft in 1998. These cases center on Google’s search and advertising practices, questioning whether the company’s behavior constitutes monopolization under U.S. antitrust law. Traditionally, antitrust enforcement has focused on physical monopolies – industries such as railroads, telecommunications, or oil – where a single entity controls access to critical infrastructure or production capacity. Markets in such cases involve tangible goods or services shielded by high barriers, like infrastructure costs or exclusive supply chain control. These barriers limit competition, making consumer harm – such as higher prices or reduced output – more evident. This directly impacts affordability and availability for end users. [1] However, digital platforms like Google operate differently, relying on control over data, network effects, and integrated ecosystems to maintain dominance. [2] A ruling against Google, particularly one involving a structural breakup, could redefine the interpretation of antitrust laws to encompass digital platforms and data-driven economies. While existing antitrust precedent does not decisively recommend the breakup of Google, given U.S. Courts’ historical focus on monopolies involving physical infrastructure or overt market manipulation, a ruling in favor of such a remedy would mark a significant shift in antitrust enforcement, expanding the application of structural remedies to digital platforms and data-driven monopolies.

Ongoing proceedings against Google, presided over by Judge Amit Mehta in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, have culminated in two major lawsuits targeting the tech giant's monopolistic practices in search and advertising markets. [3] The first suit, filed in October 2020, alleges Google violated antitrust law, namely Section 2 of the Sherman Act, by using exclusionary contracts to maintain its monopoly in the search market. [4] The DOJ’s case hones in on agreements Google has made with Apple to make Google the default search engine on Safari. The DOJ also examines similar arrangements with Android device manufacturers that have been central to the DOJ's case. These contracts secure Google’s search dominance by foreclosing competitors from gaining access to key distribution channels. [5] Judge Amit Mehta’s August 2024 ruling found Google guilty of unlawfully maintaining its search monopoly by inhibiting free competition. The court is now deliberating on potential remedies to increase competition, with structural solutions; a breakup of Google’s search business is now being actively considered. [6] The second case, initiated in September 2024, focuses on Google’s advertising business. The DOJ alleges that Google’s dual role as both buyer and seller in the ad tech market, coupled with exclusive contracts, have created insurmountable barriers for competitors as per Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. [7] The DOJ's push for a breakup of Google’s ad tech business underscores the unique challenges of regulating data-driven monopolies. [8]

The legal foundation of the DOJ’s cases lies in Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, a landmark piece of legislation passed in 1890 – amidst the rise of industrial trusts – to prevent monopolies from stifling competition and exploiting consumers Section 1 addresses agreements that unreasonably restrain trade. Although not the central focus of the DOJ’s case, Google’s exclusive contracts with manufacturers and browsers could be interpreted as precisely the sort of concerted action to limit market access for competitors that violates Section 1. [9] Section 2, the focal point of the DOJ’s case, prohibits the willful maintenance of monopoly power through “anticompetitive” practices. The DOJ argues that Google’s leveraging of its search dominance, coupled with its control over advertising platforms, constitutes unlawful monopolization. [10] By foreclosing competitors’ ability to access critical data and distribution channels, Google has effectively insulated itself from meaningful competition, thereby suppressing market innovation. Specifically, Google’s control over vast user data and its exclusivity agreements prevent rivals from developing competitive ad-targeting algorithms or gaining visibility on key platforms, stifling innovation that could lead to more personalized services, lower advertising costs, and improved consumer choice. [11] Furthermore, a central pillar of the DOJ’s case is its emphasis on “competition harm”, which shifts the focus from traditional, direct, consumer-centric metrics, such as higher prices, to the broader effects of monopolistic practices on market dynamics. In digital markets, monopolistic practices can harm competition itself by foreclosing rivals, even if consumer prices remain static or low, which can create the impression that consumers are being left unharmed. [12] This shift in focus represents an evolution in antitrust jurisprudence, signifying alignment with the realities of platform-driven economies.

Legal experts and analysts often draw comparisons between the DOJ’s case against Google and United States v. Microsoft (1998), the last major antitrust case against a tech giant. In the late 1990s, the United States Department of Justice and 20 state attorneys general filed antitrust suits against Microsoft, alleging that the company had used its dominance in the personal computer operating systems market to stifle competition, particularly in the web browser market. Microsoft was accused of tying its Internet Explorer browser to its Windows operating system, thereby leveraging its monopoly in operating systems to gain an unfair advantage in the browser market. [13] The case resulted in a landmark ruling by Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson, who initially recommended splitting Microsoft into two separate entities: one to handle its operating systems and the other its software applications. [14] However, this remedy was later overturned on appeal because The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit found procedural irregularities in Jackson’s conduct, as well as a lack of compelling evidence that a breakup was the only viable remedy for restoring competition. [15] Instead, the Court opted for a consent decree that imposed behavioral remedies – a precedent that has since been utilized in antitrust cases against IBM in the 1980s and Intel in the early 2000s. A consent decree is a legally binding agreement approved by a judge, often used to resolve antitrust cases without the corporation being compelled to admit guilt. Rather, it outlines specific actions the defendant must take to restore competition. [16] The consent decree required Microsoft to provide more transparency to developers and prohibited the company from entering exclusive contracts, which the Court deemed might restrict competition. The court determined that breaking up Microsoft could have unintended consequences, such as discouraging innovation or disrupting the software industry, which depended heavily on the Windows ecosystem. Such disruption could have affected not only Microsoft but also third-party developers, enterprise customers reliant on Windows-based solutions, and even consumers, who might face reduced functionality and compatibility in their software ecosystems. [17]

The breakup of AT&T in 1982 provides a rare example of antitrust enforcement in the tech industry involving structural remedies, which the enforcement actions against Google may mirror. In 1974, the DOJ filed a lawsuit charging AT&T with monopolizing telecommunications services and equipment in the United States, alleging that its control over local telephone networks stifled competition in long-distance and equipment markets. [18] The case culminated in a 1982 consent decree mandating the breakup of AT&T into seven regional Bell operating companies, or “Baby Bells.” Similar concerns arise in the DOJ’s case against Google, whose dominance in search and advertising markets parallels AT&T’s historical monopoly over telecommunications networks. This remedy addressed the vertically integrated nature of AT&T’s monopoly, where its dominance across multiple stages of service delivery created formidable barriers for competitors. Just as AT&T’s control over local and long-distance services stifled innovation and consumer choice by requiring competitors to rely on its infrastructure at non-competitive rates, Google leverages its integrated platforms and vast troves of user data to maintain dominance. By separating AT&T’s local exchange services from its long-distance operations, the Court aimed to stimulate competition, leading to innovation and new market entrants like Verizon and Comcast, though critics argue it replaced a monopoly with an oligopoly. [19] Likewise, Google’s exclusivity agreements with device manufacturers and browser providers, ensuring its search engine remains the default, have limited consumer access to alternative search engines like Bing or DuckDuckGo. [20] A ruling against Google, particularly one involving a structural breakup, could similarly aim to dismantle the integration that underpins its market power and reshape the digital economy.

For consumers, such a breakup could have both transformative benefits and profound risks. On the one hand, greater competition in search and advertising markets could lead to more innovation, such as the development of new tools and features tailored to diverse consumer needs, increased privacy protections that give users greater control over their data, and improved services as competitors strive to differentiate themselves. For instance, consumers might benefit from alternative search engines offering specialized functionalities, such as enhanced local search capabilities or advanced privacy options, that better align with their preferences and values. This increased diversity could reduce Google’s ability to unilaterally shape digital experiences, empowering consumers to choose platforms that prioritize their specific needs. [21] On the other hand, critics warn that breaking up Google’s ecosystem could disrupt the seamless user experience that many have come to rely on. For example, integrated search-to-shopping pipelines might no longer function as efficiently, forcing users to navigate multiple disconnected platforms to accomplish tasks that Google currently streamlines. Similarly, the loss of personalized recommendations powered by Google’s interconnected services could make online interactions less intuitive and more time-consuming for individuals accustomed to these conveniences. [22] Additionally, the fragmentation of Google’s ad tech business could lead to higher advertising costs that may eventually trickle down to consumers in the form of pricier goods and services. [23] A ruling in favor of structural remedies against Google would redefine the scope of antitrust enforcement, signaling a willingness to apply such measures to digital platforms and data-driven monopolies. While the decision could restore competition and curtail the dominance of tech giants, it also raises questions about the trade-offs for consumers, who stand to gain from market diversification but may lose the efficiencies and conveniences of Google’s integrated ecosystem.

Edited by Aidan Hunter

[1] Brennan, Tim. 2025. “Big Tech as an Unnatural Monopoly.” Milken Institute Review. Accessed February 16. https://www.milkenreview.org/articles/big-tech-as-an-unnatural-monopoly. 

[2] ProMarket Writers. 2024. “Google Monopoly Ruling Marks Milestone in Big Tech Antitrust Debate.” ProMarket. August 16. https://www.promarket.org/2024/08/09/google-monopoly-ruling-marks-milestone-in-big-tech-antitrust-debate/. 

[3] 2025. Complaint: U.S. and Plaintiff States v. Google LLC [2023]. Accessed February 17. https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/1566706/dl. 

[4] “Justice Department Sues Google for Monopolizing Digital Advertising Technologies.” 2025. Office of Public Affairs | Justice Department Sues Google for Monopolizing Digital Advertising Technologies | United States Department of Justice. February 6. https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/justice-department-sues-google-monopolizing-digital-advertising-technologies. 

[5] 2025a. U.S. and Plaintiff States v. Google LLC. Accessed February 17. https://www.justice.gov/d9/2024-02/420252.pdf. 

[6] U.S. and Plaintiff States v. Google LLC.

[7] U.S. and Plaintiff States v. Google LLC.

[8] Mulholland, Maura. 2023. “A Matter of Trust: The Sherman Act in the Age of Technology.” Columbia Undergraduate Law Review. Columbia Undergraduate Law Review. May 8. https://www.culawreview.org/current-events-2/a-matter-of-trust-the-sherman-act-in-the-age-of-technology?rq=google. 

[9] “Sherman Antitrust Act.” 2025. Legal Information Institute. Legal Information Institute. Accessed February 16. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/sherman_antitrust_act#:~:text=Sherman%20Antitrust%20Act%20of%201890,is%20codified%20in%2015%20U.S.C. 

[10] MacCarthy et al.. 2024. “Google’s Antitrust Troubles Demonstrate the Need for a Digital Regulator.” Brookings. October 2. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/googles-antitrust-troubles-demonstrate-the-need-for-a-digital-regulator/. 

[11] Mulholland, Maura. 2023. “A Matter of Trust: The Sherman Act in the Age of Technology.”

[12] MacCarthy et al.. 2024. “Google’s Antitrust Troubles Demonstrate the Need for a Digital Regulator.” 

[13] “U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 f.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).” 2025. Justia Law. Accessed February 16. https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/253/34/576095/. 

[14] “U.S. v. Microsoft: Court’s Findings of Fact.” 2018. Antitrust Division. July 26. https://www.justice.gov/atr/us-v-microsoft-courts-findings-fact. 

[15] “U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 f.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).” 2025. Justia Law.

[16] “Consent Decree.” 2025. Legal Information Institute. Legal Information Institute. Accessed February 16. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/consent_decree. 

[17] Gilbert, Richard, and Michael Katz. 2001. “An Economist’s Guide to U.S. v. Microsoft.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 15 (2): 25–44. https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.15.2.25. 

[18] “United States v. American Tel. and Tel.. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1983).” 2025. Justia Law. Accessed February 16. https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp/552/131/1525975/. 

[19] Crandall, Robert W. 2010. After The Breakup: U.S. Telecommunications in a More Competitive Era. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers / Brookings Institution Press. 

[20] “U.S. and Plaintiff States v. Google LLC [2023] - Trial Exhibits.” 2024. Antitrust Division. October 31. https://www.justice.gov/atr/us-and-plaintiff-states-v-google-llc-2023-trial-exhibits. 

[21] Blair Levin, Tom Wheeler, Barry G. Rabe, Tom Wheeler, Elaine Kamarck, and Stephanie K. Pell. 2024. “A Primer on Some Key Issues in U.S. v. Google.” Brookings. August 22. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/a-primer-on-some-key-issues-in-u-s-v-google/. 

[22] Crowley, Mark. 2025. How Google Humanizes Technology in the Workplace and You Can, Too. Accessed February 17. https://www.fastcompany.com/3028812/how-google-humanizes-technology-in-the-workplace-and-you-can-too. 

[23] Mulholland, Maura. 2023. “A Matter of Trust: The Sherman Act in the Age of Technology.”